contemporary structural functional theory

Footnote 2 Roughly, new functionalism holds that functionally individuated states and processes constitute kinds if they figure into a range of successful models instead of well-supported laws.

To address these concerns, Weiskopf ( 2011a, 2011b, 2017) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation-we refer to this reformulation as new functionalism. This leaves functionalism in a precarious position regarding whether and how functionally individuated states and processes can legitimately figure into explanations. According to mechanists, it is through mechanistic decomposition that the special sciences ultimately achieve their explanatory aims. On the other hand, recent growing support for mechanistic explanation in the special sciences suggests that functionalism’s emphasis on roles can be problematic if it prevents scientists from decomposing systems under investigation into mechanisms (Craver & Bechtel, 2006 Bechtel & Richardson, 2010). The main problem with this defense is that it has become doubtful whether there are any such laws in the special sciences (Cartwright, 1999 cf. On the one hand, early defenders of functionalism, like Fodor ( 1974), argued that the existence of well-supported laws involving functional kinds vindicates functionalism as an explanatory strategy. While functionalism is still dominant in many domains of the biological, behavioral, and psychological sciences, evolving debates in philosophy of science indicate problems with traditional arguments in support of functionalism. Footnote 1 Functionalists maintain that such functionally individuated states and processes can legitimately figure into explanations in the special sciences. The standard view of functionalism holds that some states and processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than on what they are strictly constituted of. Whether functionalism offers a legitimate basis for providing explanations in the special sciences is an on-going debate in philosophy of science. Our argument is intended to have the double impact of deflecting criticisms against new functionalism from the perspective of mechanistic decomposition while also expanding the scope of new functionalism to encompass the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional kinds. We aim at demonstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explanatory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. In this paper, we seek to defend new functionalism and to recast it in light of the concrete explanatory aims of the special sciences. We refer to this reformulation as ‘new functionalism’. Recently, Weiskopf (2011a, 2011b) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation. Generally construed, functionalism is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. A subsequent paper (Part C) examines criticisms of functionalism, describes other schools of social theory in relation to it, and discusses the use made of social theory in OR.Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like economics, psychology, and biology. At the same time sufficient detail is provided to enable the reader to appreciate the complexity and depth of social theory in general and the functionalism of Parsons in particular. This paper summarizes the attempt by Parsons to develop an extensive and arguably comprehensive foundational basis for sociology. Further developments published in Working Papers in the Theory of Action (with Bales and Shils) and Economy and Society (with Smelser) focused on the relationship between the social and the economic system introducing the ‘four-function paradigm’ or AGIL model. In these books he introduces his system of ‘pattern variables’. In 1951 the results were published in two books, Towards a General Theory of Action (with Shils) and The Social System. He developed some key concepts to characterise the structure of social interaction and then expanded the scope of his framework to cover all aspects of society including some initial thoughts on how it maintains its stability and how it changes.

Having developed his action frame of reference and his voluntaristic theory of action in The Structure of Social Action (described in Part A), Talcott Parsons turned his attention to the social system per se.

Contemporary structural functional theory